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Positivism, empiricism and
criminological theory
Don Weatherburn
New South Wales Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research
and
Mark Findlay
Centre forJustice Studies, Mitchell College, New South Wales
Introduction
The discipline of criminology has been dominated since the turn of
the century by an explanatory paradigm' known as 'positivism'. The
distinctive features of that paradigm have been both substantive and
methodological. On the substantive side 'positivist criminology' has
been marked by a commitment to the explanation of criminal beha-
viour (and deviance generally) in terms of characteristics of the indi-
vidual. Thus positivist criminology has been notable for its
explanations of criminal behaviour in terms of gross bodily features, 2
patterns of child-rearing,3 genetic defect,4 and idiosyncratic persona-
lity traits5 . On the methodological side positivist criminology has
been marked by a preference for scientific method in the evaluation of
theory and scientific ideas in the formulation of that theory.' By and
large these methodological predilections have meant assigning a pri-
macy both to the role of systematic observation in the evaluation of
theory and to the avoidance of theoretical assumptions whose validity
could not be checked by recourse to observation.
The dominance of positivist criminology has been lately under
challenge from a current of opinion which describes itself as the 'new
criminology' .'
The new criminology has objected strenuously to the apparent
presupposition of positivist criminology that the explanation of
1. The term 'paradigm' is borrowed from Thomas Kuhn's seminal work The Structure of
Scientific Revolutions and is used here to describe any set of substantive assumptions and
procedures which unite a group of explanations in a common tradition.
2. See the account of Lombroso's theory given by Gina Lombroso Ferrero Criminal Man
According to the Classification of Cesare Lombroso. (1911), pp 10-24 as summarised by John
Lewis Gillin in Criminology and Penology, (1945, 3rd edition).
3. See the Differential Association Theory of Edwin H. Sutherland Principles of Crimino-
logy (1947, 4th edition).
4. See, for example, the XYY Theory of Criminal Violence put forward by W. H. Price,
J. A. Strong, P. B. Whatmore and W. R. McClemont in The Lancet, 1:565-566 (March
1966).
5. See, for example, H. Eysenck Crime and Personaliy (1964), pp 100-119.
6. The dominant ideas were those deriving from medicine such as 'normal', 'patho-
logical' and the general notion that crime might be symptomatic of physical and/or
mental disturbance.
7. See I. Taylor, P. Walton andJ. Young The New Criminology (1973).
Published in Legal Studies, 1985 July, Vol. 5, Issue 2, pp. 191-204.
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criminal behaviour is to be found solely by reference to characteristics
of the criminal. It has also strongly objected to what it calls the
positivist 'insistence' that:
'the premises and instruments which are alleged to be successful in
the study of the physical world are... of equal validity and promise in
the study of society and man.'
8
In fact the new criminology considers that this insistence of sci-
entific method is responsible for the narrow focus of positivist
criminology and that only by overthrowing the commitment to sci-
entific method can a 'truly social' explanation of 'deviance' be given.
9
Once this is done, it would seem, an account of criminal behaviour is
possible which restores 'meaning"' to criminal action and which
destroys the political assumption of social consensus on which it rests.
A curious thing about the vigour of the anti-positivist attack is that
it has been more difficult to sustain in practice than in theory. Thus
we find Taylor reasoning toward the class significance of soccer hooli-
ganism from data showing the occupational breakdown of convicted
soccer hooligans, Taylor, Walton and Young offering an explanation
of industrial sabotage based on an analysis of actual industrial acci-
dents 2 and Quinney condemning the positivists for their realist
assumptions abouf existence while relying on Kolko and Domhofi's
empirical documentation of evidence for his theory of crime control 3 .
This lapse into positivist methodology (albeit for purposes quite
remote from those of traditional positivist theory) suggests that the
breadth of the new criminology's attack on positivist criminology may
have been too wide. Specifically it suggests that the presumed nexus
between positivist criminology's substantive commitment and its
methodological commitment may be much weaker than its critics
have supposed.
It is the thesis of this article that the suggestion is correct, moreover
that the new criminology's attack on 'positivist methodology' is mis-
guided. Acceptance of this thesis is shown to carry three broad impli-
cations. The first is that it is possible to reject some of the substantive
commitment of positivist criminology without at the same time
rejecting its methodological commitment. The second is that there is
no need to reject scientific method in the formulation of an adequate
theory of criminal behaviour. The third is that it is possible to combine
elements of the explanatory paradigms of positivist and new crimino-
logy into one general framework within which explanations of
criminal behaviour and deviance may be developed. Our progress
toward these conclusions will take place in three steps. First we will
8. Op cit n7 above, p 11.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
11. See I. Taylor in S. Cohen (ed) Images of Deviance (1971), p 154.
12. Ibidpp 219-243.
13. See R. Quinney in I. Taylor, P. Walton andJ. Young (eds) Critical Criminology (1975)
p 194.
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briefly review the origins of positivist criminology and explain the
distinction between positivism and empiricism overlooked by the new
criminology. Next we will show the immunity of this empiricism to the
criticisms of the new criminology. Finally we will sketch in outline a
way in which elements of positivist criminology and the new crimino-
logy may be merged.
Positivist criminology: method and substance
Both the method and substance of positivist criminology derive much
of their inspiration from medicine and psychology. Beginning with
Enrico Ferri's determination to place the process of sentencing on a
scientific footing, the focus of criminology has been the individual and
its method of analysis has been (as far as possible) that of science.
Much of this is due to the spectacular success of physical science in
the latter half of the nineteenth century, a success which the newly
emerging domains of medicine and psychology were keen to
emulate.'4 It was this desire to emulate the success of physical science
which caused psychology, in particular, to fall vulnerable to any
criticism that its endeavours were apiece with those of speculative
philosophy. Psychology sought to distinguish itself from philosophy
and tended to embrace any strictures regarding method and expla-
nation which were regarded as distinctive features of physical science.
Since the focus of psychology was, by definition, the behaviour of the
individual, inevitably it occurred that derivative disciplines such as
that of criminology 5 likewise fell prey to an emphasis on the individ-
ual and a preference for the methods of science.
By 1920 philosophy itself had become absorbed in the success of
science and there began what became an extraordinarily heated
debate on just what science and scientific method were. 6 The philo-
sophical climate in which science had developed had been dominated
by empiricism, broadly speaking the doctrine that observation is the
source of all genuine knowledge. 7 By the 1930s this doctrine had been
developed into a dogma known as 'logical positivism' by a school of
philosophers' whose writing, ironically enough, was to have enor-
mous influence on psychology and criminology throughout the period
1940-19609. Logical positivism claimed to have established a criter-
ion which would distinguish science from non-science. The criterion it
claimed would perform this feat was the principle of reductionism; the
14. See G. Sykes Criminology (1978), p 11.
15. Ibidch 1.
16. See for example the series Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science Vols I, II and III
and the bitter debate between Karl Popper and the Vienna Circle over the possibility of
a demarcation criterion between science and non-science.
17. The doctrine finds its modern origin in the classic philosophic work by David
Hume (ed L. A. Selby-Bigge) A Treatise on Human Nature 1739-1740 (1888).
18. The school was known as the Vienna Circle and at one time or another comprised
the philosophers L. Wittgenstein, M. Schlick, R. Carnap and 0. Neurath.
19. This was the period in which the psychological school known as 'behaviourism'
developed most rapidly. See E. Boring A History of Experimental Psychology (1960), ch 24.
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notion that all meaningful statements are or are reducible to
statements about observations.20 In its extreme form logical positi-
vism maintained that all scientific statements could be taken one by one
and, through repeated definition, be reduced to elementary proposi-
tions about sensory experience.21
One immediate by-product of positivist strictures regarding science
in psychology was the emergence of behaviourism.22 According to the
behaviourists the focus of all psychological explanation should be the
relationship between events in the environment (ie 'stimuli') and the
behaviour of the organism (ie its 'responses'). References to an individ-
ual's thoughts, desires, motives, feelings or beliefs were considered
unscientific since they were not reducible to statements about observa-
tions. They were therefore to be avoided. In the same spirit all con-
jecture was discouraged which was not 'empirically testable', that is,
confirmable or refutable on the basis of properly controlled observa-
tion.23 The emphasis on the latter was partly responsible for psychol-
ogy's flight into the study of animal behaviour and for its enthusiastic
absorption of the more recondite notions of inferential statistics. As the
theories and research techniques of psychology steadily began to filter
into academic criminology and agencies of the criminal justice system,
criminology too began to acquire an individualist focus and positivist
methodology.
There is no doubt that the constraints positivism imposed upon
theory dramatically affected the character of what could be classed as
legitimate criminological (or social) explanation. Theoretical atten-
tion turned almost exclusively to the task of identifying the correlates
(eg broken homes, personality traits, etc) of deviant or ciminal beha-
viour. There was no sense in asking, save for purely heuristic purposes,
what the deviant or the criminal had to say about his or her own beha-
viour. Such verbalisation was considered (at best) a kind of epiphe-
nomenon lying between the real cause and effect of environmental
condition and observable response.24 Imagine the difficulties attendant
upon explaining soccer hooliganism by reference to generalisations
about class structure and its dynamic or working class 'alienation'. The
fact that these theoretical notions could not be translated into
statements about observable things rendered them, according to pos-
itivism, formally meaningless. Moreover, it was not enough to point to
evidence in support of the existence of 'class structure' or 'alienation'.
The terms had to be definable in ways which turned the statements
containing them into statements about observation. For as long as it
20. See W. V. 0. Quine Word and Object (1960) ch 2.
21. See R. Carnap Der Logisch Aufbau der Welt (The Logical Syntax of Language) (Berlin,
1928), translated in 1937 by Harcourt, Brace Inc.
22. Above, n 19.
23. This approach reached its purest expression in the work of B. Skinner. For a useful
discussion of his approach see R. Boakes and M. Halliday in Explanation in the Behavioural
Sciences (1970, ed R. Borger and F. Cioffi).
24. Ibid.
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remained influential, positivism drove criminology into a narrow con-
cern about the correlates of individual deviant behaviour and the
methods by which they could be identified.
In the event, positivism did not remain influential, for its strictures
regarding science and scientific method were discredited."5 It is now
generally conceded that scientific theories cannot be pulled apart and
translated sentence by sentence into statements about observations,
though the reasons for this are too complex to examine here. The
empiricism which gave birth to positivism, on the other hand, has
survived in a much refined form. It remains a fundamental tenet of
empiricism that the validity of all theories must ultimately be assessed
in terms of their success in predicting or explaining relevant observa-
tions. Theories are to be preferred, therefore, which are susceptible to
such empirical tests. This, however, does not imply that only 'observa-
ble' theoretical concepts are scientific. The theorist is free to call upon
whatever concepts he wishes to explain his observations. Naturally if
the explanation is to be useful such concept should eventually
generate observable implications. But in performing this function
the important fact is that the concepts and the implications may
concern any subject matter at all deemed essential to an adequate
explanation of the phenomena at hand. The constraints imposed by
empiricism on theory are accordingly much weaker than those
imposed by positivism.
The criticisms of the new criminology
The subtleties of this historical transition are lost in the heat of debate
over what is seen as positivism in criminology. As Downes and Rock
point out:
'At times a package deal is presented in which functionalism, positi-
vism, empiricism, evolutionism, and determinism are collectively
linked with a "consensus" approach to social problems and a conser-
vative approach to their solution.' 28
The package deal on positivist criminology now includes
complaints about the notion of scientific neutrality,29 the assumption
of social consensus,30 the dependence on scientific method, the
unproblematic treatment of the social reaction,32 the problem of
25. The three most potent attacks have come from K. Popper's The Logic and Scientific
Discovery (1972), W. Craig's 'Replacement of Auxiliary Expressions' in Philosophical
Review 65 (1956) 38-55, and W. V. 0. Quine's From a Logical Point of View (1963), ch 2.
26. See above n 25.
27. An explanation from which no implications (concerning the observation or obser-
vations it is meant to explain) can be drawn affords no basis for evaluating its adequacy.
See discussion below.
28. D. Downes and P. Rock Understanding Deviance (1982), p 75.
29. Taylor, Walton and Young op cit n 7 above, p 19.
30. Opcitn 7 above, p 31.
31. Op cit n 7 above, p 28.
32. Op cit n 7 above, p 26.
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multiple realities33 and the assumption of determinism34 . In fact it is
considerably easier to identify the new criminology by the constell-
ation of its objections than by its own explanatory assumptions. We do
not have space here to discuss all these objections but considerable
progress can be made if the key issues are singled out for treatment. In
our submission the key issues are the assumption of social consensus,
the individualist character of positivist criminology and the proposi-
-tion that the adoption of scientific method is incompatible with the
elaboration of an adequate theory of criminal action.
(a) The Problem of Consensus
Most textbooks at pains to define the term 'deviance' find themselves
thrust up against a characterisation of it as rule violation. And that,
with a few refinements, is also where most textbooks stop. The usual
refinement is some sort of explication of the notion of a rule, and usual
explication is in terms of a social norm or law or both. So it has been
among sociologists such as Cohen,35 Merton 36 and Gibbons and
Jones37 and among psychologists such as Eysenck38 and Trasler 9.
The new criminologists object to the definition. Their objections are
two-fold. Firstly they dispute the assumption of social consensus on
which the definition rests.' They maintain that there are real conflicts
of social and moral value and that the assumption of consensus belies
equally valid yet competing conceptions of 'reality'. Their second
objection is that the 'posititists' assumption of social consensus
allows them to relegate 'alternative or deviant realities', to 'the realm
of the meaningless', thereby sanctioning the repression of deviance
itself.
The first objection breaks into two separate criticisms. One is that
there are conflicts of social value and that this is inconsistent with the
assumption of social consensus on value implied by normative defi-
nitions of deviance. The other is that there is no such thing as an
objective or 'true' state of affairs and that each person's 'reality' is
equally valid. The second of these will be dealt with in our discussion
of scientific method.
The first of their objections is, in part at least, well founded. As a
device for marking out a field of study the definition of deviance as
norm-violation may be unproblematic. It does capture most of the
phenomena which have ben the traditional subject matter of
deviance. As a device for marking out of the explicandum of theory
though, deviance-as-norm-violation is altogether too nebulous a
33. Op cit n 7 above, p 26.
34. Op cit n 7 above, p 21.
35. A. Cohen Deviance and Control (1966) p 1.
36. R. Merton Contemporay Social Problems (1966) p 805.
37. Q. Gibbons andJ. Jones The Study of Deviance (1975) p 44.
38. Crime and Personality above, n 5. ,
39. G. Trasler The Explanation of Criminality (1962).
40. Social norms generally being defined as shared social expectations it follows that
deviance defined as a violation of social norms assumes the existence of 'shared social
expectations' (ie social consensus).
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notion. How is a theory to be applied in situations of widespread
conflict over social value? What sorts of observations may, without ad
hoc assumptions4 about social norms, be taken as relevant to the
assessment of theory? Tax evasion and the sale of dangerous drugs are
deviance to some, but probably acceptable behaviour to major
sections of the population.42 They cannot reasonably be dismissed as
irrelevant to criminology when the dishonesty which marks them both
is a central focus of most investigations of working class crime.
3
Moreover it serves no useful purpose to say, as Box'4 does, that the
norms of the criminal law function as an 'authoritative resolution' of
the social normative order. For 'authoritative resolution' though they
may be, they are evidently not shared by large sections of society.
Admitting the force of the objection is nonetheless no admission of
an argument against empiricist criminology, whether from the
standpoint of its empiricism or from its historical interest in
explaining deviance in terms of the individual. Neither empiricism
nor even positivism carry any implications about the existence or
otherwise of social consensus, though historically positivist crimino-
logy has taken the assumption of social consensus for granted. So have
a range of other criminological schools.4' Nor, on the substantive side,
does the commitment to explaining criminal behaviour in terms of
characteristics of the individual carry any implication that social
consensus exists on the values embodied by the law against which
criminal behaviour is defined (though again positivist criminology has
tended to assume it).
The weakness of the new criminology's attack in this matter stems
from two related sources of confusion. The first is a confusion of an
historical with a logical fact. The historical fact that criminology has
been empiricist in outlook and has assumed the existence of social
consensus on value has been treated as an indication that empiricism
and assumptions of social consensus are logically related. They are
not. Further, the contingent fact that criminology has been individua-
list in focus and disposed td assuming social consensus has also been
treated as if one implied the other. Again, it does not. Evidence, then,
which goes to show the absence of social consensus does not show the
inadequacy of positivist criminology, that is, the error in its individua-
list focus or empiricist outlook. At best it shows a disposition on the
part of theorists who adopt either of the latter, to assume the former.
Perhaps this is in fact the criticism actually being made by the new
criminology; that by focussing empirical attention on the criminal and
41. If a theory purports to explain deviance or a class of deviance, observations
pertaining to deviant behaviour become potential tests of the theory's adequacy. If,
however, it is possible to explain away every potential test of a theory by saying, on a
purely ad hoc basis, that the behaviour in question wasn't deviant, the theory becomes
unfalsifiable.
42. See, for example, P. Wilson andJ. Braithwaite (eds) Two Faces of Deviance (1978) chs
6 and 10.
43. Ibid p 5.
44. S. Box Deviance, Reality and Society (1981, 2nd edn).
45. See nn 35, 36 and 37 above.
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the crime, attention has been distracted from the hidden purpose of
the laws by which these two are defined. It is difficult to know where to
begin with such a criticism. Though one might cavil at an objection to
a domain of study which is so expressly political, one cannot help but
feel sympathy for those who wish to draw criminology away from the
narrowness of its traditional focus. In our view there is no essential
incompatibility between explaining deviance and explaining the ori-
gin and function of laws which define it. But it is worth noting that the
'new criminology', after assailing the criminological positivist's histo-
rical preoccupation with explaining deviance, assigns a central place
to it within the so-called social theory of deviance.' It expects that an
adequate theory may encompass the explanation of adolescent delin-
quency within such notions as 'blockage of opportunity', 'status frus-
tration' and 'alienation'.4 7 These will be embedded in a 'social
psychology of crime' which connects the individual's beliefs and
motivations to the pressures and demands created by the political and
economic structure of society.' It is hard to see in any theoretical
prospectus a clearer commitment to defining deviance as norm-
violation, or one more ripe for empirical analysis.
(b) The problem of 'analytical individualism'
One senses though, that at the heart of objections to empiricism lies a
rejection of the individualist tradition of explanation and the
specialist/interventionist programme it has spawned. The traditional
interests of positivist criminological theory have focussed on the
individual and have borrowed heavily from the medical ontology of
normality, disease and control.49 Eysenck is, of course, the purest
example of this and it is no surprise that his somewhat tendentious
claims to scientific respectability have encouraged a rejection of
science by those who see his theories as misguided and/or dangerous.
Eysenck's attempt to explain deviance by reference to some deviant
characteristic of the individual, however, is just that last in a long line
of similar positivist efforts stretching back to Lombroso. ° What is so
striking about these efforts is their persistence in the fact of sustained
and damaging empirical criticism.' What is most surprising about
the new criminology is that it chooses to dismiss this criticism as
simply part of an 'internecine squabble' going on within positivism.
46. Taylor, Walton and Young op cit n 7 above, pp 268-282.
47. Op cit n 7 above, p 271.
48. Op cit n 7 above, p 273.
49. It is fair to say that even where positivist criminology expressly rejected the view
that criminal behaviour was pathological, its preoccupation with developing techniques
of deviance control placed it squarely in the medical/interventionist tradition. The
distrinction between the normal and the pathological is not purely the province of the
positivist criminologist. Durkheim for example, relied on a medical analogy to develop
his functionalist rules governing 'social facts'. See E. Durkheim The Rules of Sociological
Method (1964).
50. C. Lombrozo Crime; its Causes and Remedies (1913).
51. This criticism is actually referred to, though largely ignored by, Taylor, Walton
and Young, n 7 above, p 46 and 58.
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The empirical evidence against the presumption that deviance or
criminal behaviour can be explained solely by reference to the individ-
ual is ample testimony to the fact that 'analytical individualism' (as
the new criminology calls it) and empiricism are separable commit-
ments. Positivist criminology, if it so chose, could reject the individua-
lism yet retain its empiricist outlook. There is no reason to suppose
that scientific method, or empiricism generally, may not be adapted to
the purpose of formulating social theories of criminal behaviour and
evaluating them. This should come as no surprise. Empiricism, is
after all, a doctrine about the sources of our knowledge, not the con-
tents. Scientific method consists of a set of procedures for evaluating
purported statement of fact, not a set of statements about what the
facts are on any given (say) criminological issue.
It does not take the discovery of evidence against positivist crimino-
logy, however, to establish a case that the methodology of science is
applicable to social questions and theories. Durkheim himself pro-
posed that the success of the natural sciences could be matched by the
social sciences provided similar methods were adopted.52 Whether
one accepts Durkheim's preferences in the classification of social
phenomena is beside the point. He leaves no doubt about one way in
which the task of applying science to social explanation might pro-
ceed. Confronted with this awkward fact Taylor, Walton and Young
have made much of an assertion by Durkheim that:53
'... every time that a social phenomenon is directly explained by a
psychological phenomenon, we may be sure that the explanation is
false.'
Their reliance on Durkheim's thesis, however, betrays the recurrent
confusion of individualist explanation with the methodology of empi-
ricism. Durkheim's thesis, if accepted, entails a rejection of individua-
listic explanations of deviance. It does not entail the
inappropriateness of scientific method or empiricism to the study of
social phenomena. Such an implication only obtains where it is
assumed that individualist criminology and empiricist methodology
are logically connected. But to assume that is to beg the question since
no argument has been presented to the effect that the rejection of
individualist criminology requires the rejection of scientific method.
The two have been rejected solely by dint of their historical association
with one another.
(c) Scientific method
We are left, then, with the remaining question of 'scientific method'
and the extent to which its adoption is inconsistent with the frame-
work of criminological explanation envisaged by the new criminology.
That framework is essentially one which emphasises the social and
political origins of deviant behaviour and which seeks to expose those
52. See the discussion of Downes and Rock, n 28 above, pp 80-81.
53. Op cit n I above, p 72.
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origins through an analysis of the beliefs, attitudes and values of the
deviant. As indicated earlier, we do not believe that contemporary
empiricism imposes any constraints on theory which preclude expla-
nation in the terms favoured by the 'new criminology'. It does not
preclude an explanation, in particular, of deviant actions in terms of
motives, beliefs and values unless a case is made out that no theory
can be cast in these terms which is amenable to empirical evaluation.
The same applies to the social phenomena of deviance, whether
explanation is sought in terms of class structure, social alienation or
'anomie'. But as Taylor, Walton and Young raise three definite issues
on the question of scientific method, it would be as well to address
ourselves to these issues directly. The three issues are the problem of
'multiple realities', the assumption of determinism and the problem
of 'meaning'.
We have already dealt with one leg of the first problem in our
discussion of conflicts of value and their relation to normative defin-
tions of deviance. The second leg of that problem, it will be recalled,
concerns the suggestion that there may be equally valid yet competing
views of the world, of what constitutes 'reality'. The example given by
Taylor, Walton and Young to illustrate their point is drawn from
Lichtman: 4
'How many true descriptions of a social act are available? An indefi-
nitely large number. What is it then I do when I lecture? Amuse
students, undermine the university, rationalize the pretended libera-
lity of American society, satisfy parental expectations, earn a living,
remove my efforts from an indefinitely large number of alternatives,
etc?'
Lichtman goes on to make the point that the choice of which, among
these alternative descriptions, is true, is class structured. One is left to
infer from the use to which Taylor, Walton and Young put the
example that (a) there are an indefinite number of alternative descrip-
tions of any action, any pair of which is, or all, may be regarded as
equally valid; and (b) that the choice among alternative descriptions
is determined by social and political factors. Does this add up to a case
against the validity of scientific method as espoused by empiricists?
The answer is no. There may be an indefinite number of true
descriptions of an event or state of affairs. But from the standpoint of
scientific method the question is whether there is one among that
number which is inconsistent with the theory under examination. The
choice of how to describe a process is obviously dependent upon the
purposes for which it is being described and those purposes will
themselves no doubt be shaped by all manner of social and psycho-
logical considerations. That has no bearing on, nor does it imply the
proposition that any description of an event or process is a true
description. It is this latter proposition, not Lichtman's, which would
force the abandonment of scientific method.
54. Op cit n 1 above, p 27.
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The problem of determinism is more complex. The assumption
that every event has a cause is a vexed one in philosophy and in
physical science. Much of physics now proceeds as if certain events
do not have or cannot be discovered to have identifiable causes.5 In
the realm of human behaviour the problem is complicated by notions
of free-will which, it is often felt, are inconsistent with determinism.
Individuals evidently exercise choice in their actions yet the choices
made are recurrently associated with prior social conditions of
specified kinds by different theorists. The new criminologists may
assiduously promote the need for a social theory of deviance which
assumes free choice, but they never tire of attributing deviance and
the ruling class oppression of it to prior social and economic condi-
tions.5" This may not be determinism but then it is hard to see what
distinguishes it methodologically from the older criminologist's pre-
occupation with individual well-springs of action. The dispute
between the old and new criminology would seem more a dispute
over what causes deviance than over the propriety of theories which
affirm or deny free will. Our own view is that any attempt to explain
deviance or the State's criminalisation of it must of necessity involve
recourse to assumptions about how one state of affairs is associated
with another. If the assumption of free will in human action militates
against such assumptions, the enterprise of criminology, not just
empiricist explanation, would seem hopelessly flawed. In practice
one suspects that the objections to determinism stems from a convic-
tion that, somehow, 'meaning' is denied to behaviour when it is
explained as the result of antecedant conditions. Whether this is true
or not depends very much on what a theory identifies as the antece-
dant conditions. Taylor, Walton and Young, for example, insist
that:"
'To explain social phenomena demands social analysis involving the
meaning that the behaviour has to the actor.'
In part, these claims are simply an affirmation that attempts to
explain social phenomena (particularly deviance) by reference to
characteristics of individuals have failed. This is a conclusion well
supported by existing evidence. But the notion that explanations of
behaviour in terms of a person's motives and beliefs are somehow
unscientific flies in the face of contemporary work in psychological
theory. There is no need to enumerate counter-examples. Only the
behavourists ever maintained that theories of human behaviour
couched in cognitive terms were unscientific. Eminent psychologists
from Freud to Festinger have argued to the contrary. More to the
point; they have developed explanatory theories which give new
meaning to behaviour and, which have been the subject of quite
55. The classic illustration of this is given by Heisenberg's, Uncertainty Principle
(AX.ApXh/4x) according to which it is impossible in principle to state both the position
and momentum of an electron with certainty.
56. Op cit n 7 above, ch 9.
57. Op cit n 7 above, p 60.
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intensive empirical evaluation. 8 There is every reason to believe then,
that theories of deviance in the terms favoured by the 'new criminolo-
gists' may be given and evaluated without abandoning the methods of
science.
Now for some it must be said, the very effort to explain deviance is
enough to distract from or disguise its political significance. Con-
strued narrowly, such a sentiment is tantamount to an invitation to
give up formal explanation altogether. But even on a sympathetic
interpretation of the argument, its validity may be seen dependent on
the style of explanation considered. If an explanation of individual
deviant action (in terms of motives, beliefs and/or values) is knitted
into a larger fabric of political and social explanation the argument
fails. In such a case the analysis of individual cognition is likely to
heighten rather than attenuate the political questions raised by
deviant action. The likely outcome of a scientific explanation of
deviant behaviour embedded in a theory of the State would be to relay
political questions down to, not away from, the individual and his or
her beliefs. The fears of the new criminologists and others on this
score would therefore seem mistaken. They arise from the (by now
familiar) fact that the critics of empiricism have been deluded into
thinking that a scientific explanation of deviance must take the form
dictated by traditional positivist criminology.
A rapproachment between empiricism and the new
criminology
Let there be no mistake about the thrust of the preceding arguments.
We do not contend that the arguments of positivist criminology
regarding the substantive explanation of deviance are in any shape or
form satisfactory. We agree with those who seek to broaden the
explanatory focus of criminology to include the actions of those who
impose, uphold or administer sanctions against deviance or criminal
behaviour. Moreover we wholeheartedly support the efforts of the new
criminology, in particular, to shift the explanation of deviant beha-
viour on to a social footing. Our principle concern is that in achieving
these aims, criminology should not place itself in an untenable posi-
tion by rejecting a scientific approach to the understanding of
deviance. Equally it should not suppose that the development of a
social theory of deviance in any way necessitates the abandonment of
all emphasis on the individual in the explanation of deviance. All that
is required is to give psychological or individual theories and social
theories their proper balance in the overall pattern of criminological
explanation. The link between the two may be explained in the
following way.
Except in the extreme case of criminological explanations which
deny any role to causes lying outside an agent's body, a full account of
deviant behaviour must inevitably include social and psychological
58. A useful introduction to this material is available in C. Coombs, R. Dawes and A.
Tversky Mathematical Psychology: An Elementary Introduction (1970), ch 1.
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components. An explanation of deviance couched in terms of social
inequality or the tendency of the ruling class to criminalise behaviour
which threatens its interest, inevitably arrives at the point where it
must explain how such factors influence a given individual. The
psychology of deviance may be construed as the task of spelling out
the processes by which, within an individual, social factors or forces
exert their effects. The task of sociology transpires as the business of
articulating theories which identify and explain the interrelationships
among those factors and forces. Obviously an adequate social theory
must be compatible with the mechanisms of individual action
identified by psychology. But then no adequate psychological theory
could be given which conflicted with what is known about the social
and political basis of deviance.
Lest this harmonious arrangement appear too Utopian to be
believed, it is worth drawing attention to one example of the way in
which it actually appears. Trasler has argued that the prevalence of
crime among the 'lower classes' is a consequence of permissive, erra-
tic, punitive, 'unprincipled' child-rearing.59 On his account the lower
classes share the same goals as the middle class, but their techniques
of socialisation are less efficacious for the purpose of inculcating
values appropriate to the pursuit of those goals. Taylor, Walton and
Young rebut this account by drawing attention to empirical evidence'
showing that, in fact the socialisation of the lower class is as effective
as that of the middle class but is directed to different ends. They also
point out the inherent bias created in social indicators of deviance by
the socially selective nature of law-enforcement processes. 6, In both
cases we see social facts constraining psychological theory. It takes no
leap of the imagination to see that, conversely, an adequate psycho-
logical theory of deviance must at the very least be consistent with the
known social facts of deviance. At its best, an adequate psychological
theory will spell out the mechanism by which social causes exert their
effects upon the individual.
Thus far we have assumed rather than argued for the value of
retaining a commitment to scientific method in criminology. It may
well be asked what sort of incentive there is to do so. In our submission
the incentive lies in the test of adequacy for any theory that purports
to deal with the observable world. Whatsoever esoteric concepts may
be embraced by particular criminological theory, whether it entails a
commitment to 'beliefs', 'values', 'alienation', 'mechanisms of oppres-
sion' or to 'introversion-extroversion', the final test of the theory's
validity lies in its capacity 'for working a manageable structure into
the flux of experience'.
62
It makes no difference whether the motives for formulating a theory
are intensely political (eg to draw attention to unrecognised oppres-
sion) or arcanely aesthetic (eg to explain the whole of deviance within
59. Op cit n 7 above, p 63.
60. Op cit n 7 above, p 60.
61. Ibid.
62. W. V. 0. Quine From a Logical Point of View (1963), p 44.
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a single elegant paradigm); the task of evaluating theoretical ade-
quacy remains one of evaluating the extent to which the theory is in
accord with the observations which bear upon its truth or falsity. The
task is never easy and (within the social sciences) rarely definitive. But
the alternatives (eg evaluating theories on the basis of their intuitive
appeal or political utility) are unappealing to anyone with a taste for
convincing explanation.
Of course the demand for 'objectivity' and 'scientific method' may
be used as a device to rule out of consideration, a priori, certain kinds of
explanations of criminal behaviour. So too can the demand for a
renunciation of these things. The virtue of attempting to make one's
theoretical assumptions explicit and of adopting certain conven-
tional, common-sense procedures for evaluating them is that these
things act against the tendency to embrace theories solely on the basis
of the intuitive or political appeal. In the long run it is difficult to
maintain a theory, any theory, as the evidence against it begins to
mount up. If criminology is ever to distinguish itself from arm-chair
speculation, it must, like the physical sciences before it, get out of its
armchair. To do so, we would argue, should place no more constraints
on the character of its speculations than those imposed by the evi-
dence at hand. And for those who consider that a requirement that
theories be cast in a form amenable to empirical evaluation will serve
only to support the 'ruling paradigm', we would add, in conclusion,
that there is nothing more subversive of the 'ruling paradigm' than
empirical evidence against it.
